Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2015

State of Utah, Plaintiff/ Appellee, v. Shoni Plexico, Defendant/
Appellant.
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, State of Utah v Plexico, No. 20140590 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2015).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3177

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons.
Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/
policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with questions or feedback.

J. BRYAN JACKSON, P.C.
J. BRYAN JACKSON USB #4488
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
95 North Main Street, Suite 25
PO Box 519
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0519
(435) 586-8450
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Criminal No. 13 I 500464
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

SHONI PLEXICO,

Appellate Case No. 20140590
Trial Court Judge: G. Michael
Westfall
Sentencing Judge: Keith C. Barnes

Defendant/A

ellant.
REPLY OF APPELLANT PLEXICO
This is an appeal from the judgment, sentence, stay of execution of sentence, and
commitment, by the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron County, State of Utah, the
Honorable G. Michael Westfall presiding at trial and the Honorable Keith C. Barnes
sentencing and ruling on Appellant's motion for new trial. The judgment, sentence, stay
of execution of sentence and commitment filed on the 21 st day of May, 2014, and the
Court's order upon Defendant's motion to stay execution of sentence and for new trial
filed the 1?1h day of July, 2014. The Appellant is not presently incarcerated.
DEBORAH L. BULKELEY (13653)

SEAN REYES (7969)
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
PO Box 142320
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-2320
(801) 366-0260
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee

J. BRYAN JACKSON, (4488)
J. BRYAN JACKSON, P.C.
95 North Main Street, Suite 25
Post Office Box 519
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0519
(435) 586-8450
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant Plexico

CANDACE N REID
TYLER G. ROMERIL
IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY
·82 North 100 East, Suite 201
Cedar City, Utah 84720
(435) 865-5310
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

AUG 2 5 2015

J. BRYAN JACKSON, P.C.
J. BRYAN JACKSON USB #4488
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
95 North Main Street, Suite 25
PO Box 519
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0519
(435) 586-8450
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Criminal No. 131500464
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

SHONI PLEXICO,

Appellate Case No. 20140590
Trial Court Judge: G. Michael
Westfall
Sentencing Judge: Keith C. Barnes

Defendant/Appellant.
REPLY OF APPELLANT PLEXICO
This is an appeal from the judgment, sentence, stay of execution of sentence, and
commitment, by the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron County, State of Utah, the
Honorable G. Michael Westfall presiding at trial and the Honorable Keith C. Barnes
sentencing and ruling on Appellant's motion for new trial. The judgment, sentence, stay
of execution of sentence and commitment filed on the 2 I st day of May, 2014, and the
Court's order upon Defendant's motion to stay execution of sentence and for new trial
filed the l ih day of July, 2014. The Appellant is not presently incarcerated.
DEBORAH L. BULKELEY (13653)

SEAN REYES (7969)
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
PO Box 142320
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-2320
(801) 366-0260
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
CANDACE N REID
TYLER G. ROMERIL
IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY
82 North 100 East, Suite 20 I
Cedar City, Utah 84 720
(435) 865-5310
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee

J. BRYAN JACKSON, (4488)
J. BRYAN JACKSON, P.C.
95 North Main Street, Suite 25
Post Office Box 519
Cedar City, Utah 84 721-0519
(435) 586-8450
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant Plexico

,~,\

-.w

TABLE OF CONTENTS
JURISDICTION .................................................................................................................. 1
RESOLUTION OF ST A TEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................. 1
RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS ................................................................. 2

POINT NO. 1
POINT NO. 2

POINT NO. 3

POINT NO. 4

POINT NO. 5
POINT NO. 6

POINT NO. 7
POINT NO. 8

POINT NO. 9

POINT NO. 10

The Appellant's issue on appeal regarding sufficiency of
evidence is properly preserved. (Pg. 2)
Since counsel for Appellant was her attorney at trial, it
would be inappropriate to argue ineffective assistance of
counsel. (Pg. 4)
The Appellee cites to no case law that supports the
proposition that mere words are sufficient to support a
charge of witness tampering. (Pg. 5)
Appellant has adequately briefed the issue since there is
no precedent that establishes the point one way or the
other. (Pg. 6)
The trial court abused its discretion in excluding
Appellant's Assault Acquittal. (Pg. 7)
The instruction offered by the court admitting assault
evidence without advising the jury of acquittal allowed the
jury to draw an unreasonable inference as to its result
which prejudiced the jury in their deliberation
notwithstanding the instruction to not consider such
accordingly. (Pg. 9)
The trial court abused its discretion in denying
Defendant's motion for new trial. (Pg. 10)
The Appellee attempts to blame the Appellant for the
improper inference that the jury was led to believe that
the Appellant was convicted of assault. (Pg. 10)
The Appellant was denied the opportunity of impeaching
the witness who in this case was her only accuser based
upon inconsistent statements at the previous trial. (Pg. 11)
The Appellant did not invite error in the elements
instruction. (Pg. 12)

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 13
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ................................................................................ 14
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ......................................................................................... 15

11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES AND RULES
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code Annotated, § 78A-4-103(2)( e) (19 53, as amended) ...................... I
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24 ................................ 6, 14
Rules of Evidence, Rule 404 ......................................... 7, 8
Rules of Evidence, Rule 401. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Rules of Evidence, Rule 402. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

CASES
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,Il 8 .......................................... 6
State v. Carlson, 638 P.2d 512,515 (Utah 1981) ............................... 6
Salt Lake City v. Williams, 2005 UT App 493 ................................ 11
State v. Geukgeuzian, 2002 UT App 130 ..................................... 13

111

IN THE UT AH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPELLANT IS NOT
INCARCERATED

Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

Criminal No. 131500464
Appellate Case No. 20140590
Trial Court Judge: G. Michael
Westfall
Sentencing Judge: Keith C. Barnes

SHONI PLEXICO,
Defendant/Appellant.

I.
JURISDICTION
Appellee agrees with Appellant that jurisdiction is appropriate before the Utah
Court of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78A-4-103(2)(e) (1953, as
amended).

II.
RESOLUTION OF STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellee makes no attempt to take issue with Appellant's Statement of Facts,
but simply as an introduction attempts to reargue the point in controversy regarding the
underlying charge of which the Appellant was acquitted but which established the basis
for going forward with the felony charge of witness tampering. Appellee goes to great
lengths to argue that the Appellant fails to cite to any precedent in support of Appellant's
assertion that mere words alone are not sufficient to support a conviction for a charge that

has as its founding qualification a term that invites overbroad application if the same is
interpreted to not require some outward act beyond mere words. In other words, "attempts
to induce or otherwise cause another person to testify or infonn falsely" has not been
clearly defined by the Court of Appeals to include mere words in the past and there is no
such precedent primarily because this particular case is sufficiently unique to where there
are no facts or circumstances that support Appellee 's attempted inference that the action
taken by Appellant was all that the statute requires. In a subtle way, this is conceded by
the Appellee in not making specific reference to the record of activity beyond that stated
by the Appellant which involved the alleged misconduct. To that extent, the case is one of
first impression and Appellee's attempt to argue that Appellant has failed to persuade by
failing to cite to precedent is an acknowledgement of that point and should not be swept
under the carpet as established by accepting Appellee's tortured restricted interpretation
of the preservation doctrine.

III.
RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS
POINT NO. l
THE APPELLANT'S ISSUE ON APPEAL REGARDING SUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE IS PROPERLY PRESERVED.
The Appellee makes the argument that the issue regarding sufficiency of evidence
was not properly preserved primarily because Appellant did not argue specific points as to
why the evidence was insufficient at the time Appellant made a motion for directed
2

verdict. A complete examination of the references to the record, of which Appellant has
included in her brief, shows that the court was particularly keyed in on the issue in
question not only at the time of the directed verdict but also when admonishing counsel
on what it considered to be an appropriate argument (an action taken by the comi
questionable in and of itself) to admonish beforehand what defense counsel may or may
not argue at closing, stating that it would be inappropriate for defense counsel to argue
that the law required more than an attempt to persuade. It was based upon this frame of
reference as well as the context of the entire trial that the Appellant moved for directed
verdict and it was not a matter of rehashing common ground in which the record clearly
reveals that the trial court was aware of this distinction in the facts and this is noted when
it stated that it had listened with interest but in its mind the elements of the offense did
not require an act which in this case would have amounted to a change that was referred
to by counsel on making the motion. This is the same as saying that mere words alone are
sufficient to establish the crime. That was the issue and that was addressed. For Appellee
to attempt to qualify it by stating that it should have been argued differently and then
raised as an exception to the preservation doctrine misrepresents the circumstances before
the court.
The issue was clearly before the trial court when it made its ruling and it was for
that reason that counsel allowed the matter to be submitted rather than attempting further
to dissuade it in its thinking. The issue has been raised. The trial court made its decision.
3

The trial court was well aware of the circumstances upon which counsel was contending
that the elements of the offense have not been met by construing the statute to make it a
crime by using mere words.

POINT NO. 2
SINCE COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT WAS HER ATTORNEY AT TRIAL, IT
WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO ARGUE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL.
Appellee attempts to make an extension as to how Appellant should have argued
an exception to the preservation rule by arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. It
would be inappropriate for counsel for Appellant to argue ineffective assistance of
counsel when he was the one who represented the Appellant at trial. This is not a case
involving ineffective assistance of counsel. In fact, this appears to be an attempt to simply
argue precedent rather than key into the facts and circumstances of this particular case.
Appellant concedes that there are points and authorities out there that apply to
circumstances that are different than the present circumstances. However, the present
circumstances do not warrant arguing ineffective assistance of counsel where the issue
was preserved on appeal regarding the arguments that Appellant has made on appeal. For
Appellee to argue matters not pertinent to the circumstances of this case is a distortion of
that which is before the court.
Ill
Ill
4

POINT NO. 3
THE APPELLEE CITES TO NO CASE LAW THAT SUPPORTS THE
PROPOSITION THAT MERE WORDS ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A
CHARGE OF WITNESS TAMPERING.
Appellant disagrees with Appellee's assessment that the evidence the State
produced "amply supported" a finding of attempt to induce or otherwise cause CRUZ to
testify or infonn falsely if the following were believed:
( 1)

CRUZ initially rep011ed to Officer Triplet that Defendant shoved CRUZ to
the ground and hit LISTER. 1-20-21, 1-50-51;

(2)

Officer Triplett cited Defendant for misdemeanor assault, Rl 80: 152;

(3)

Defendant called Officer Triplett to report that CRUZ wanted to change her
statement, R 180: 153; and

(4)

Defendant asked CRUZ "to lie to the cop and say that she never hit Josh
(LISTER) R180:120-21, 153. (emphasis added)

The Appellant takes the position that this alone is not sufficient to establish a
charge of witness tampering if attempt to induce or otherwise cause is not construed to
include an act that goes beyond merely asking someone to lie. Since this case does not
support any act above and beyond the asking, the Appellant takes the position that the
evidence is not sufficient for the charge. Since Appellee' s brief fails to allude to any other
activity above and beyond those points asserted, it concedes that there is no such act
apparent in the record and therefore the issue is one squarely before the Court for
5

consideration but the matter is not supported by precedent. Appellee's citation that
evidence is sufficient to support a witness tampering conviction is not supported by State
v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,r 18, which simply restates the standard for plain enor under a
sufficiency of evidence claim but involved murder and aggravated burglary. It had
nothing to do with interpreting the phrase "to attempt to induce or otherwise cause".
Appellee cites to no appropriate authority in this case because there is none.

POINT NO. 4
APPELLANT HAS ADEQUATELY BRIEFED THE ISSUE SINCE THERE IS NO
PRECEDENT THAT ESTABLISHES THE POINT ONE WAY OR THE OTHER.
Appellee attempts to argue that the Appellant has failed to follow Rule 24, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, in presenting substantive arguments by not citing to
controlling authority to support the argument as though such points and authorities
existed. Appellee makes no attempt to cite to points and authorities that would otherwise
be controlling but restates the position stated by Appellant and without further argument
even points out that a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad when it prohibits a
substantial amount of protected speech. Appellee does so without addressing the matter as
to why the speech in this case is not protected, a position not supported by controlling
authority. Appellee attempts to assert that use of the word "induce" in the statute clearly
indicates that it applies to verbal as well as physical interference with a witness. In this
case, there was no such interference which connotes an act above and beyond simply
asking someone to lie for them. State v. Carlson, 638 P.2d 512, 515 (Utah 1981 ),
6
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involved conduct supportive of an inducement which is not found in the present case.
Appellee argues that Appellant should have made a point of distinguishing such case even
though the case predated the present version of the law. The points made by Appellant are
adequate and appropriate to address the issue at hand without having to cite to authority
that no longer applies due to such change.

POINT NO. 5
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN EXCLUDING
APPELLANT'S ASSAULT ACQUITTAL.
Appellee misses the point entirely with regard to the issue of advising the jury of
Appellant's acquittal of the underlying charges. The point is that the trial court did not
make an evaluation of the circumstances based on the rules of evidence. There was no
analysis made and no consideration given where if such would have been done it is likely
the evidence would have been admitted had the Appellant been convicted of the charge.
However, in this case, the trial court did not make the proper assessment but simply
concluded that such evidence would be inadmissible. Any evaluation of the circumstances
pursuant to the Rules of Evidence, particularly Rule 404, would have concluded
differently. Moreover, the matter is not one simply involving the discretion of the trial
court without a determination or finding that such in some way would have been
prejudicial to the State. The infonnation was clearly relevant and it was probative to the
issue at hand. There is nothing in the record to suggest that such information would have
been prejudicial to the State and this in and of itself distorts the basis for such
7

consideration in the first place. The Appellant contends that while the issue of evidence
being less probative than prejudicial against a Defendant is an appropriate consideration
for trial, the State is not entitled to have evidence not admitted on the same basis. The
Appellant is not aware of a single case that attempts to apply Rule 404 in the manner that
the trial court infers which is that information regarding a defendant's acquittal would be
prejudicial to the State in attempting to convict a defendant of witness tampering. The
very thought of such application is absurd. This is by any definition an abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court in not properly addressing the matter in context, considering
it in light of the defendant being prejudiced by not allowing such infonnation is what
should have been assessed but was not. For Appellee to argue that such infonnation was
not relevant is to ignore Rules 40 I and 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, which state clearly
that evidence is relevant if it has a tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it
would be without the evidence. The comments made by the juror that came forward
clearly show that the issue was one that the jury in its deliberation thought was relevant
and to argue otherwise is to again ignore the underlying facts and circumstances of this
case.

Ill
Ill
Ill
Ill
8

POINT NO. 6
THE INSTRUCTION OFFERED BY THE COURT ADMITTING ASSAULT
EVIDENCE WITHOUT ADVISING THE JURY OF ACQUITTAL ALLOWED
THE JURY TO DRAW AN UNREASONABLE INFERENCE AS TO ITS RESULT
WHICH PREJUDICED THE JURY IN THEIR DELIBERATION
NOTWITHSTANDING THE INSTRUCTION TO NOT CONSIDER SUCH
ACCORDINGLY.
Appellee misses the point with regard to the instruction that was given at trial that
improperly allowed an inference of conviction under circumstances where the jury was
entitled to know whether the defendant had been convicted of the underlying charge as
part of their deliberation. To allow such prejudiced the Appellant. The trial court refused
to submit the instruction provided by defense counsel because it believed that the State
would be prejudiced by informing the jury of the acquittal. The State is not entitled to
such non-prejudicial consideration. This is not going to be a matter that has precedent
because it is a distortion of the application of the Rule. The Rule is not designed to
consider whether or not the State is prejudiced by submitting information regarding an
acquittal of an underlying charge that is relevant and material to the jury's deliberation.
Had the instruction been given offered by Appellant at trial, the jury would not have been
allowed to speculate about the Appellant having been convicted of the underlying
charges.

Ill
Ill
Ill
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POINT NO. 7
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
Appellee attempts to argue that the motion for new trial was unfounded because it
was based upon infonnation that was inadmissible. In fact, the affidavit is part of the
record and there has been no ruling of inadmissibility. The State did not oppose the
affidavit in its argument and submitted no points and authorities for such proposition. To
assume that the information was inadmissible, goes beyond that which is in the record.
The motion for new trial was appropriate also based upon the ruling of the trial court to
deny infonnation regarding the acquittal and the opportunity presented itself because it
was before a different judge to consider such ruling. The new trial court judge denied the
same without such consideration. Appellee's attempt to argue the precedent set forth in
Rule 606 fails to recognize that there is no underlying determination made by the trial
court to exclude such evidence that was made a part of the record. The issue of its
admissibility is one that should be made at the trial court level and not second guessed on
appeal without having the opportunity to address such matters before the trial court.

POINT NO. 8
THE APPELLEE ATTEMPTS TO BLAME THE APPELLANT FOR THE
IMPROPER INFERENCE THAT THE JURY WAS LED TO BELIEVE THAT
THE APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED OF ASSAULT.
The Appellee seems to take the position that it is Appellant's fault for allowing the
jury to infer that she had been convicted by eliciting infonnation that was part of the facts
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and circumstances of the case. Trial should not be a game of hide and seek. The facts are
what they are. The issue is not one of what infonnation should be kept from the jury but
rather allowing the jury to receive relevant information in proper context. The jury in this
case was denied the opportunity to consider all the evidence in its proper light by being
denied the opportunity to be informed of the resulting acquittal of the charges. The
evidence introduced by Appellant on cross examination and as part of her defense were
relevant because it was part of the case just as it was relevant for the jury to be properly
admonished as to whether or not she was convicted or acquitted of the underlying charges
without being instructed in such a way for them to improperly infer that she had been
convicted when she had not. That is in fact the issue before the Court and the reason why
the admonition given by the trial court in this case was not appropriate. The Appellant is
not complaining about the evidence that was presented at trial, the Appellant is
complaining about a key piece of evidence that was not allowed to be presented at trial.
Therefore, Salt Lake City v. Williams, 2005 UT App 493 does not apply to the
circumstances of this case.

POINT NO. 9
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY OF IMPEACHING THE
WITNESS WHO IN THIS CASE WAS HER ONLY ACCUSER BASED UPON
INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS AT THE PREVIOUS TRIAL.
The Appellee attempts to argue that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
this matter because it invited counsel for Appellant to address issues of impeachment in
11

other areas. However, the Appellant asserts that the basis upon which the trial court ruled
disallowing the inquiry of impeachment sought by the Appellant is inappropriate and
Appellee cites to no authority to the contrary. Rather, Appellee takes the position of
admonishing this Court to decline from addressing the matter because it its view
Appellant should have argued plain error when in fact the issue was preserved at the trial
court level and has been set forth in Appellant's brief. The issue is not one of what the
trial court thought to be reasonable areas of inquiry for impeachment purposes but rather
whether or not the trial court was correct in disallowing the inquiry made by Appellant at
trial. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in not allowing such inquiry and this
should not be compromised by the fact that counsel for Appellant did not follow the line
of inquiry that the trial court suggested was open for impeachment. The issue of trial
court discretion is not one of whether invited areas of cross-examination are offered but
that which the trial court ruled upon in denying the Appellant the opportunity to impeach
the witness as it deemed necessary.

POINT NO.10
THE APPELLANT DID NOT INVITE ERROR IN THE ELEMENTS
INSTRUCTION.
Counsel for Appellant' response for the court's own inquiry as to whether there
was an objection is to say that there was none. However, counsel for Appellant did not
offer the instruction and that which was given was not sufficient. This is not enough to
assert that the failure to object alone is sufficient to invite error to an instruction given by
12

the com1. The circumstances of State v. Geukgeuzian are distinguishable for the reasons
set forth in Appellant's initial brief and the position in that case should not be applied in
this case due to that distinction.

IV.
CONCLUSION
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, counsel for Appellant prays
that this Court reverse or remand as it deems appropriate together with such other and

further relief as to it a p 7equitabl~ _and proper.

ft,-

DA TED this

~

day of~-+-----=~' 26/6
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